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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT P. WOOLLEY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
MILTON S. WYCOFF, 





Appellant (defendant) sets forth a statement of 
facts construed most favorably to himself and in con-
flict with evidence upon which the trial court found 
in favor of Respondent (plaintiff). However, it ap-
pears that the only question upon which Appellant 
relies on appeal is one of law and does not depend for 
solution upon the questioned statement of facts. Ac-
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2 
cordingly, although Respondent does not wholly 
agreP with Appellant's Statement of Facts, Respond-
PUt will set forth only the basic facts as they were 
found by the trial court in order to point up the law 
problem which is here presented. 
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent brought suit and recovered a judg-
ment in the trial court for commissions earned by him 
as a licensed real estate broker in procuring a tenant 
for certain of appellant's property pursuant to an em-
ployment agreement between the parties. (R. 166, 
169) 
On or prior to August 1, 1951, Appellant had 
entered into negotiations with Bessie E. Friedman and 
Western Salvage Co. for the purchase of certain 
real estate at 1550 South Second West Street in Salt 
Lake City. Shortly thereafter Appellant invited Mr. 
Robert P. Woolley, known by him to be a licensed 
real estate broker, to his office and advised him that 
he, Appellant, had an option on the property in ques-
tion, and then and there orally employed Mr. Wool-
ley to secure a tenant who would be willing to lease 
a specified portion of the property for a period of 10 
years at a rental of $400 per month. Appellant agreed 
with Respondent that in consideration for procuring 
such a tenant he would pay Respondent the usual 
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3 
and customary real estate commission then prevail-
ing in Salt Lake City for such services. (Tr. 26, 27.) 
Mr. Woolley went to work and subsequently 
located a willing tenant, a Mr. A. A. Easton, who 
was ready, willing and able to enter into the proposed 
lease on defendant's terms and who so stated to de-
fendant. Thereafter, upon Defendant's assurance that 
the lease was being drawn by his attorney, Mr. 
Easton moved an entire gun manufacturing plant 
from Trinidad, Colorado, into the leased premises. 
(Tr. 34, 35, 36, 37, 38.) Thereafter defendant refused 
to exercise his option, left Mr. Easton in the premises 
without an enforceable lease, and refused to pay Mr. 
Woolley for his services. 
Evidence duly adduced showed that the usual 
and customary as well as the fair and reasonable 
broker's commission then prevailing in Salt Lake City 
for procuring a tenant to lease premises was five per 
cent of the agreed rental for the first five years of the 
lease, and three percent thereof for the next five 
years. (Tr. 48-50.) 
The court found in favor of the plaintiff and al-
lowed him the commission agreed upon for procuring 
a tenant ready willing and able to enter into a lease 
with the landlord on his terms. 
Defendant asserted the Statute of Frauds as an 
additional defense, specifying in particular Sees. 33-
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5-1, 3 ~-5-3, and 33-5-4, U .C.A. 1943, now Sections 25-
S-1, 2S-5-3, 25-5-4, U.C.A. 1953. It is this question of 
the Statute of Frauds upon which the present appeal 
solely rPsts. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Point I. 
An Agreement of Employment of a Real Estate 
Broker to procure a tenant is not an "Agreement Employ-
ing an Agent or Broker to purchase or sell Real Estate," 
for the reason that such employment involves only 
Personal Property, rather than "Real Estate" as that 
term is used in the Statute of Frauds. 
Point II. 
An Agreement of Employment of a Real Estate 
Broker to procure a tenant is not an "Agreement Employ-
ing an Agent or Broker to purchase or sell Real Estate," 
for the reason that such employment does not involve 
either a purchase or a sale but merely the procuring of 
a person willing to enter into a further agreement to use 
and possess property title to which remains with the 
owner. 
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Point I. 
An Agreement of Employment of a Real Estate 
Broker to procure a tenant is not an "Agreement Employ-
ing an Agent or Broker to purchase or sell Real Estate," 
for the reason that such employment involves only 
Personal Property, rather than "Real Estate" as that 
tenn is used in the Statute of Frauds. 
Although appellant asserted several possible sec-
tions of the Statute of Frauds upon which he relied in 
the trial court, he now premises his argument solely 
upon Sec. 25-5-4, which is as follows: 
"In the following cases every agreement 
shall be void unless such agreement, or some 
note or memorandum thereof, is in writing 
subscribed by the party to be charged there-
with: 
* * * 
~' ( 5) Every agreement authorizing or 
employing an agent or broker to purchase or 
sell real estate for compensation." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Appellant having limited his contention to this 
one sub-section, no purpose would be served in argu-
ing the inapplicability of the other sections relied on 
at trial. · 
Appellant contends that but one question is in-
volved in this appeal: "Does the term 'real estate' 
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6 
contained in the Statute of Frauds, Sec. 25-5-4, In-
clude a ten-year lease?" 
l"he problem involved is thus stated too narrowly 
and overlooks one of Respondent's major arguments. 
There are two questions involved:· 
( 1 ) Does this arrangement relate to "real 
estate" within the meaning of Sec. 25-5-4 ( 5) ? 
(2) Does this arrangement constitute employ-
ment to "purchase or sell" within the meaning of 
Sec. 25-5-4 ( 5)? 
The transaction here involved does not relate to 
nor involve "real estate" as that term is used in Subdi-
vision ( 5) of Sec. 25-5-4, of the Statute of Frauds. 
It is generally held by the cases that under a 
statute such as ours, the term "real estate" does not 
include within its purview a "lease" of property. 
Washington has a statute of frauds substantially 
identical with our Utah law. Sec. 5825 Rem. Comp. 
Stat. provides: 
"An agreement authorizing or employing 
an agent or broker to sell or purchase real 
estate for compensation or a commission shall 
be void, unless the agreement or some note or 
memorandum be in writing.'' 
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This statute caine before the Supreme Court of 
Washington for co11struction in the case of Myers v. 
A.rthur, 135 Wash. 583, 238 P. 899, and with respect 
to it the Court said: 
"Undoubtedly at common law a leasehold, 
whatever its duration in years, was personal 
property. The rule, as stated in 35 R.C.L. 970, 
supported by abundance of cases, is: 
'Except in so far as the common-law 
rules may have been modified by statute, 
terms for years, however long, are chat-
tels real, falling within the classification 
of personal property and governed by the 
rules of law applicable to other kinds of 
personal property.' 
" ... the statute applicable to the present 
case says only 'real estate', and does not in-
clude the words 'interest in real estate.' And, 
as stated in American Savings Bank and Trust 
Co., v. Mafridge, supra, an assignment of a 
lease for a term of years was not required to 
be acknowledged, because we had no statute 
providing for it, so here it cannot be held that 
an agreement employing an agent or broker 
to sell or purchase a lease of real property for 
a term of years must be in writing, because we 
have no statute requiring it. The statute in-
voked by the appellant relates to no kind of 
property other than real estate." (Emphasis 
added) 
The Washington Court, thereafter, in the case of 
Johnson v. Rutherford, (1948), 200 P. 2d 977, 
squarely affirmed this same proposition in a case in 
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which it held that a leasehold interest in a tavern 
premises was not "real estate" within the statute 
requiring agreements employing a broker to sell real 
estate to be in writing. 
In the case of 0' Neill v. Wall, 103 Mont. 388, 62 
P. 2d 672, the Supreme Court of Montana had before 
it a problem stated as follows: 
''The question is thus presented, Is a con-
tract employing a broker or agent to induce 
others to enter into an option or lease, or a 
lease and option, required by the statute to be 
in writing." 
After citing and considering va;rious authorities 
on the subject, the Court concluded: 
"Thus it appears that a lease is not real 
estate, and accordingly a broker's contract to 
procure or sell a lease is not within the statute 
and need not be in writing." 
In the case of Dabney v. Edwards, 5 Cal. 2d 1, 53 
P. 2d 962, the California Court went into the question 
of what does and what does not constitute real estate, 
in a case involving an oral contract to sell oil leases. 
The statute involved was as follows: 
". . . an agreement authorizing or em-
ploying an agent or broker to purchase or sell 
real estate for compensation or a commission 
is invalid, unless the same or some note or 
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memorandum thereof is in writing and sub-
scribed by the party to be charged or by his 
t " agen ... 
The Court held that a lease for a period of ten 
years was personal property and not real estate with-
in the meaning of the statute. 
In the case of Guy v. Brennan, 60 Cal. App. 452, 
213 P. 265, an earlier case involving the same statute 
the Court said: 
"Appellants' second point is that the con-
tract of employment, which was oral, was in-
valid under that provision of our statute of 
frauds which provides that an agreement em-
ploying an agent or broker to sell 'real estate' 
for compensation or commission is invalid un-
less the same or some note or memorandum 
thereof be in writing and subscribed by the 
party to be charged, or by his agent ... " 
* * * 
". . . a lease for years, though a chattel 
real, is personal property, and therefore, 
though it may be an estate or interest in real 
property, its is not such an estate or interest 
as is connoted by the words 'real estate' ". 
For another similar holding see the case of Linde 
v. Huene, 205 Cal. 569, 271 P. 1087, wherein the 
plaintiff sued to recover compensation u.nder an oral 
contract to procure a tenant for an apartment build-
ing. The Court in ruling favorably to the plaintiff 
said: 
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" . The contract for their employment 
or compensation was not required to be in writ-
ing by the terms of subdivision 6 .of Section 
1624, Civil Code, which applies only to agree-
ments authorizing or employing an agent or 
broker to purchase or sell real estate." 
For similar holdings, see: Spalding v. Bennett, 
93 Cal. App. 577, 269 P. 948; Albertson v. Warner, 60 
Cal. App. 2d 595, 141 P. 2d 246; and Barr v. Campbell 
Mill Co., 154 Wash. 83, 280 P. 929. 
An annotation at 103 ALR 833 which collects 
the cases ·on the subject, states the rule to be: 
"Where . . . the statute applies only to 
'real estate', it is generally held that it does not 
cover leases for a definite term of years." 
The argument which Appellant makes for ap-
plicability of the Statute of Frauds to the present 
situation, is based upon Sec. 68-3-12 (10) U.C.A. 1953, 
wherein certain terms are defined as follows: 
"In the construction of these statutes the 
following rules shall be observed, unless such 
construction would be inconsistent with the 
manifest intent of the legislature or repugnant 
to the context of the statute. 
( 10). The terms 'land' 'real estate' and 
., 'real property include land, tenements, heredi-
taments, water, rights, possessory rights and 
claims." 
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It is submitted that the general construction 
statute is here totally and completely inapplicable by 
its own terms. The statute is to be used only as an aid 
to construction when its use would not be inconsistent 
with the manifest intention of the legislature and 
when it would not be repugnant to the context of the 
statute. In the present instance to use the general 
statute to define terms of art used in a special statute 
would be both inconsistent with the manifest inten-
tion of the Legislature and repugnant to the clear 
meaning of the statute. 
Observe the development of the various sections 
of the Statute of Frauds, with relation to real prop-
erty. And observe their interrelation with each other 
and their physical position or context in relation to 
each other in the statutes. 
Section 25-5-1, U.C.A. 1953, recites that: 
"No estate or interest in real property, 
other than a lease for a term not exceeding one 
year . . . shall be created, granted, assigned, 
surrendered or declared otherwise than by 
operation of law, or by deeds or conveyance 
in writing subscribed by the party creating, 
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring 
the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto 
authorized by writing." (Emphasis added) 
The Legislative history of this section dates back 
to Comp. L. 1876, Sec. 1010. 
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Sec. 25-5-3, U .C.A. 1953, recites: 
"Every contract for the leasing for a 
longer period than one year, or for the sale of 
any lan~s or any interest in lands, shall be 
void unless the contract, or some note or mem-
orandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by 
the party by whom the lease or sale is to be 
made, or by his lawful agent thereunto author-
ized in writing." (Emphasis added) 
This section so far as it relates to "lands or any 
interests in lands' is identical with Sec. 3918 (5) 2 
Comp. L. 1888. 
The next Section in the series is Sec. 25-5-4 ( 5), 
U.C.A. 1953, which provides: 
"In the following cases every agreement 
shall be void unless such agreement or some 
note or memorandum thereof is in writing 
subscribed by the party to be charged there-
with: 
( 5) Every agreement authorizing or em-
ploying an agent or broker to purchase· or sell 
real estate for compensation." 
In 1909, when subdivision ( 5) of Sec. 25-5-4, 
was added, therefore, the Legislature had before it 
two divisions of the Statute which had been in exist-
ence for many years, and in which the Legislature 
had,, in that chapter, specifically indicated the in-
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stances in which it wanted "interests in lands" or "in-
terests in real property" to be controlled by those 
statutes in addition to the "land" or "real property" 
itself. 
With this legislative background it is unmistak-
ably clear that when the Legislature, enlarged the 
scope of the statutes dealing with real property, as it 
did in 1909, and specifically excluded reference to 
"interests in real property," therefrom, it intended 
that "interests in real property" should not be in-
cluded within this section. Elimination of the addi-
tional language "interests in real property," from 
Subdivision ( 5), when "interests in real estate" were 
included in the other sections, would appear to be 
conclusive of the question of what the Legislature 
meant and of immeasurably greater help in de-
termining what was meant by particular words, than 
a general statute, enacted without particular refer-
ence to any subject. The context is'clear, both in the 
statute itself, and in its juxtaposition with the other 
statutes relating to real property, and to ascribe to 
the words "real estate" a meaning which would 
broaden it far beyond its ordinary and accepted mean-
ing as a term of art would be repugnant to the clear 
intent of the Legislature. 
Beyond the foregoing considerations, to affix to 
subdivision (5) the expanded meaning which appel-:-
lant suggests 'would be to create the anomalous situa-
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tion where a ~ease for a tern1 of one year or less would 
be specifically excluded from operation of the other 
sections of the Statute, (Sec. 25-4-1 and 3) and yet 
an agent or broker would be precluded from recover-
ing on a contract to procure a tenant to enter into 
such a lease. To give the term "real estate" the ex-
panded meaning which appellants seek to ascribe to 
it, would be to hold that this anomalous and incon-
sistent result is what the Legislature intended in 
enacting Sec. 25-5-4 ( 5). See Guy v. Brennan, 60 
Cal. App. 452, 213 P. 265. 
Yet another reason exists why the general statute 
(Sec. 68-3-12 ( 10), should not be applied to expand 
the meaning of the term of art "real estate" in this 
instance. 
Subsection 9 of the same Section provides: 
" ( 9) The word "property" includes both 
real and personal property." 
Subsection ( 11) provides as follows: 
" ( 11) The term 'personal property' in-
cludes every description of money, goods, chat-
tels, effects, evidences of rights in action, and 
all written instruments by which any pecuni-
ary obligation, right or title to property is 
created, acknowledged, transferred, increased, 
defeated, discharged or diminished, and every 
right or interest therein. (Emphasis added) 
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If these sections are thus read together, it is 
apparent that the lease here involved is by definition 
equally as much "personal property" under these 
sections as it could possibly be "real estate" by 
application of Section ( 10). 
Point II. 
An agreement of Employment of a Real Estate 
Broker to procure a tenant is not an "Agreement Employ-
ing an Agent or Broker to purchase or sell Real Estate," 
for the reason that such employment does not involve 
either a purchase or a sale but merely the procuring of a 
person willing to enter into a further agreement to use 
and possess property, title to which remains with the 
owner. 
Respondent takes the position that regardless of 
the holding of this Court with respect to a determina-
tion of whether or not a lease would or would not be 
"real estate" within the meaning of Sec. 25-5-4 ( 5), 
. in any event the language "purchase or sale" can-
not be expanded properly or legally to include a 
contract to obtain a tenant who is willing thereafter 
to enter into a mere lease with the owner. 
This proposition has been specifically passed 
upon in the case of Klie v. Hollstein, 98 N.J.L. 473, 
120 A. 16, wherein a broker brought suit for com-
mission for procurement of a lessee for a factory pro-
perty from the defendant. The Statute of Frauds 
provided: 
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"~No broker or real estate agent selling or 
exchanging land for or on account of the own-
er shall be entitled to any commission for the 
sale or exchange of any real estate, unless the 
authority for selling or exchanging such land 
is in writing and signed by the owner or hi~ 
authorized agent." 
The Court said: 
"Now the contract in suit is not one to pay 
commission for "selling or exchanging land," 
On the contrary, it is an agreement to pay the 
plaintiff for procuring a lessee for defendant's 
real P.state. . . Such agreement is not within 
the statute of frauds and hence is not required 
to be in writing.'' 
Again, in Miller Co. v. Woolsey, (N.J.) 128 A. 
540, the Court said: 
"The statute of frauds requiring that the 
authority for selling or exchanging lands be 
in writing has no application to a contract for 
compensation for procuring a lease." 
And in Burt v. Brownstone Realty Co. (N.J.) 112 
A. 883, the Court said: 
" ... the argument under this point is pre-
dicated upon the assumption that the agree-
ment under consideration is a contract be-
tween an owner and a broker and within Sec. 
10 of the statute of frauds; but, as we have 
already intimated, we do not take this view. 
It is not an agreement to pay 2% on the pur-
chase price for the services of a broker in ef-
fecting a sale; on the contrary, it is an agree-
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ment to compensate the real estate agent for 
negotiating a lease and endeavoring to collect 
the rent as it falls due; ... This makes the 
instrument as between the parties merely a 
contract at common law to pay certain sums 
of money in consideration of certain specified 
services, not including the effecting of a sale . . '' 
(Emphasis added.) 
So, in the present case, all the contract embraced 
was that Mr. Woolley, would render services in 
locating a tenant who would be willing to contract 
with the defendant as the continuing owner of the 
land. 
The cases are numerous which indicate in all 
fields of legislation that leasing has been distin-
guished from purchasing or selling real estate. 
In Gulf Refining Co. v. Glassell, 186 La. 190, 171 
So. 846, the Court noted that the distinction between 
a sale of real estate and a lease of real estate lay in 
the fact that sales · of property include both title 
and right to possession and is fundamentally different 
from a lease which grants only the use and enjoy-
ment of the thing leased. 
A long term lease with the payment of an an-
nual rent has been held not a sale, which is a grant 
of ownership, in the case of Chicago Aud. Assoc. v. 
Cramer, 8 F. 2d 998. 
For other cases with similar holdings distinguish-
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ing a lease from a sale see the following: Lundberg 
v. Bennett, 117 Neb. 66, 219 N.W. 851; Logan v. State 
Gravel Co., 158 ~a. 105, 103 So. 526; State vs. Evans, 
99 Minn. 220, 108 N. W. 958. 
Further support for the proposition that obtain-
ing a tenant is not a purchase or sale is to' be found 
in the following cases: 
In Lind vs. Huene, (Calif.) 271 P. 1087, there 
was involved a claim by a broker for commissions 
under an oral contract to secure a lessee. The Court 
in reviewing the application of Sec. 1624 (6) of the 
California Code said: 
". . . In the instant case the brokers were 
not authorized to sell or exchange the property, 
but only to procure a lessee. The contract for 
their employment or compensation was not 
required to be in writing by the terms of sub-
division 6 of section 1624, Civil Code, which 
applies only to agreements authorizing or em-
ploying an agent or broker to purchase or 
sell real estate." 
And in Spalding v. Bennett, 93 Cal. App. 577,269 
P. 948, where there was an oral agreement to pay a 
specified sum for procuring a lessee the Court said: 
"The transaction is not within the provi-
sions of the statute of frauds, since it was 
neither an agreement to purchase nor sell real 
estate, which in the absence of a memorandum 
in writing is prohibited by section 1624 of the 
Civil Code and Section 19 7 3 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure. 
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SUMMARY 
This Court has heretofore in the matter of Case 
v. Ralph, 56 Utah 243, 188 P. 640, extended the 
language of Sec. 25-5-4 ( 5) to cover the employment 
of a broker to procure a purchaser of real estate, as 
distinguished from the employment of a broker to 
himself directly purchase or sell real estate. 
What Appellant now asks the Court to do is to 
make three further extensions of the language of this 
Section by construction, as follows: 
1. To extend the term ''real estate'' to cover 
mere personal property and possessory interests not-
withstanding the language of the statute does not 
contain the term "interest in real estate." 
2. To extend the term "purchase or sell" to 
cover the mere employment of a broker to procure 
a person willing to buy or sell a leasehold interest as 
distinguished from purchasing or selling the interest 
in the name of the broker. (This would amount to 
an extension of the doctrine of Case v. Ralph to a 
situation not here directly involved but necessarily 
included by implication, to-wit, a situation where 
the land owner either owns an existing lease which 
he desires to sell, or is aware of an existing lease 
which he desires to purchase and acquire by assign-
ment.) 
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3. To extend the term "purchase or sell'" to 
cover the mere employment of a broker to procure 
a person not merely willing to buy or sell an existing 
lease or leasehold interest, but willing initially to 
enter into a new lease as tenant from the owner-a 
transaction which is entirely separate and distin-
guishable from a purchase or a sale and never par-
takes of or results in a buy or sell transaction either 
by the broker or by the owner. 
Plain every-day language such as "real estate" 
and "purchase or sell" does not properly or legally 
lend itself to such judicial legislation as would be 
required to embrace within the meaning of the 
statute the three separate extensions here suggested 
to the Court. Clear and unambiguous language 
would thus be distorted far beyond its normal and 
accepted meaning. 
Perhaps the situation is best summarized by a 
quotation from a book review written by Professor 
Arthur L. Corbin, Townsend Professor of Law, Emer-
itus, of Yale Law School, appearing in the June, 1953, 
number of the Yale Law Journal: 
"Ancient statutes can be wholly forgotten, 
or substantially emasculated by judicial and 
administrative action. The Statute of Frauds, 
enacted by Parliament in 1677 and re-enacted 
in substance by all of the United States, has 
been subjected to so many thousands of vari-
able and inconsistent judicial interpretations 
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and applications that a court now looks to the 
current of decisions rather than to the Statute. 
If these decisions have, as many competent 
critics believe, turned the Statute into an in-
strument for the encouragement of repudiation 
instead of the prevention of fraud and perjury, 
is it not time to look back to the \vords of the 
Statute itself rather than to the aberrant appli-
cations?" 
Respectfully submitted, 
OWEN & WARD 
DEAN W. SHEFFIELD 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
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